Suchergebnisse

I propose a theoretical model to explain the heterogeneity observed in the adoption of antidumping laws by small developing countries in an environment of multilateral tariff reduction. The analysis is based on a three-stage game of trade policy determination with imperfect competition in differentiated products where the potential lobby for protection is reflected in the government's objective function and where tariffs may be bound due to multilateral trade agreements. This framework implies that the implementation of this administrative protection device is the government's best response when multilateral bound tariffs reach a sufficiently low threshold. The heterogeneity in the adoption decision is explained by the relative size of the domestic market, the degree of product differentiation and political economy motives. Relatively large economies, highly competitive domestic markets, and countries with high domestic lobbying pressure for protection enact antidumping legislation sooner. ; Se propone un modelo teórico para explicar la heterogeneidad observada en la adopción de leyes antidumping por pequeños países en vía de desarrollo en un contexto de reducción arancelaria multilateral. El análisis se basa en un juego de tres etapas de determinación de política comercial con competencia imperfecta en productos diferenciados, donde la posible presión para la protección se refleja en la función objetivo del gobierno y donde los aranceles se pueden consolidar como resultado de acuerdos comerciales multilaterales. Este marco implica que la aplicación de este dispositivo de protección administrativa es la mejor respuesta del gobierno cuando los aranceles consolidados multilaterales alcanzan un umbral los suficientemente bajo. La heterogeneidad en la decisión de adopción se explica por el tamaño relativo del mercado nacional, el grado de diferenciación de los productos y los motivos de economía política. Las relativamente grandes economías, los mercados nacionales altamente competitivos y los países con una alta presión interna para la protección promulgan leyes antidumping mucho más rápido. ; Proponhe-se um modelo teórico para explicar a heterogeneidade observada na adoção de leis antidumping por pequenos países em via de desenvolvimento em um contexto de redução tarifária multilateral. A análise baseia-se em um jogo de três etapas de determinação de política comercial com competência imperfeita em produtos diferenciados, onde a possível pressão para a proteção seja refletida na função objetivo do governo e onde as tarifas possam se consolidar como resultado de acordos comerciais multilaterais. Este marco implica que a aplicação deste dispositivo de proteção administrativa é a melhor resposta do governo quando as tarifas consolidadas multilaterais alcançam um limiar suficientemente baixo. A heterogeneidade na decisão de adoção se explica pelo tamanho relativo do mercado nacional, o grau de diferenciação dos produtos, e os motivos de economia política. As relativamente grandes economias, os mercados nacionais altamente competitivos e os países com uma alta pressão interna para a proteção promulgam leis antidumping mais rapidamente.

I propose a theoretical model to explain the heterogeneity observed in the adoption of antidumping laws by small developing countries in an environment of multilateral tariff reduction. The analysis is based on a three-stage game of trade policy determination with imperfect competition in differentiated products where the potential lobby for protection is reflected in the government's objective function and where tariffs may be bound due to multilateral trade agreements. This framework implies that the implementation of this administrative protection device is the government's best response when multilateral bound tariffs reach a sufficiently low threshold. The heterogeneity in the adoption decision is explained by the relative size of the domestic market, the degree of product differentiation and political economy motives. Relatively large economies, highly competitive domestic markets, and countries with high domestic lobbying pressure for protection enact antidumping legislation sooner. ; Se propone un modelo teórico para explicar la heterogeneidad observada en la adopción de leyes antidumping por pequeños países en vía de desarrollo en un contexto de reducción arancelaria multilateral. El análisis se basa en un juego de tres etapas de determinación de política comercial con competencia imperfecta en productos diferenciados, donde la posible presión para la protección se refleja en la función objetivo del gobierno y donde los aranceles se pueden consolidar como resultado de acuerdos comerciales multilaterales. Este marco implica que la aplicación de este dispositivo de protección administrativa es la mejor respuesta del gobierno cuando los aranceles consolidados multilaterales alcanzan un umbral los suficientemente bajo. La heterogeneidad en la decisión de adopción se explica por el tamaño relativo del mercado nacional, el grado de diferenciación de los productos y los motivos de economía política. Las relativamente grandes economías, los mercados nacionales altamente competitivos y los países con una alta presión interna para la protección promulgan leyes antidumping mucho más rápido. ; Proponhe-se um modelo teórico para explicar a heterogeneidade observada na adoção de leis antidumping por pequenos países em via de desenvolvimento em um contexto de redução tarifária multilateral. A análise baseia-se em um jogo de três etapas de determinação de política comercial com competência imperfeita em produtos diferenciados, onde a possível pressão para a proteção seja refletida na função objetivo do governo e onde as tarifas possam se consolidar como resultado de acordos comerciais multilaterais. Este marco implica que a aplicação deste dispositivo de proteção administrativa é a melhor resposta do governo quando as tarifas consolidadas multilaterais alcançam um limiar suficientemente baixo. A heterogeneidade na decisão de adoção se explica pelo tamanho relativo do mercado nacional, o grau de diferenciação dos produtos, e os motivos de economia política. As relativamente grandes economias, os mercados nacionais altamente competitivos e os países com uma alta pressão interna para a proteção promulgam leis antidumping mais rapidamente.

This paper evaluates the effect on firm-level export outcomes of the Cash Incentive Scheme for Exports program provided by the Government of Nepal. The analysis utilizes customs-level data for 2011-14, combined with information on the subsidy payments made to individual firms provided by the Central Bank of Nepal. The Cash Incentive Scheme for Exports cash subsidy is available to firms exporting a select group of products, and requires firms to export to countries other than India. Overall, the subsidy has not produced a significant impact on firm-level export values, prices, quantities, or their growth rates. However, the study finds a small positive effect on the number of eligible products exported to countries other than India and the number of destination markets reached among firms that receive the subsidy. These results are consistent with the fact that the subsidy was granted primarily to large exporters that were already shipping eligible products to countries other than India. The findings suggest that although the cash subsidy has not produced a significant increase in exports, it has achieved a positive impact on export diversification for firms that were already satisfying the scheme's eligibility criteria.

High levels of trade costs persist in the world trading system, despite recent progress in tariff reduction, trade facilitation, and logistics. At least some of these costs can be attributed to non-tariff measures (NTMs), policies imposed by governments other than ordinary customs duties which have an impact on the price at which exports and imports are traded, the quantities traded, or both. Such costs are particularly worrisome if they have a discriminatory or protectionist effect, or violate countries' international commitments. However, even NTMs designed to carry out domestic regulatory objectives – for example, protection of human, animal or plant health, consumer or workplace safety, or the environment – can have substantial effects on international trade, which should be considered when such policies are developed. This book discusses some of the analytical methods that can be used to accompany the process of policy development for NTMs. It discusses the broad economic rationale for improving the design of NTMs;, illustrates the main forms of quantification of NTMs and their effects, including inventory approaches, price-based approaches, and quantity-based approaches; proposes a new analytical and measurable concept of "regulatory distance" to help guide deep integration efforts at the regional level; provides a discussion of the effects of NTMs on household expenditures, poverty, and firm competitiveness; and shows how empirical analysis of NTMs can be used to inform policy advice. As such, it should provide a valuable addition to the arsenal of tools available for applied analysis of international trade policy.

Special economic zones (SEZ), one of the most important instruments of industrial policy used in developing countries, often impose export share requirements (ESR). That is, firms located in SEZ are required to export more than a certain share of their output to enjoy a wide array of incentives—a practice prohibited by the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. In this paper we exploit the staggered removal of ESR across products and over time in the SEZ of the Dominican Republic—a reform driven by external commitments to comply with WTO disciplines on subsidies—to evaluate how ESR affect export performance at the product and firm levels. Using customs data on international trade transactions from the period 2006 to 2014, we find that making the Dominican SEZ regime WTO‐compliant made SEZ more attractive locations for exporters to be based in. The reform, however, did not have a significant effect on the country's exports or on the share of export value originating from SEZ.